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This paper considers the evidence of “near-rationality,” as described by Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 
(2000). Using detailed surveys of household inflation expectations for the United States and 
Sweden, we find that the data are generally unsupportive of the near-rationality hypothesis. 
However, we document that household inflation expectations tend to settle around discrete and 
largely fixed “focal points,” suggesting that both U.S. and Swedish households gauge inflation 
prospects in rather broad, qualitative terms. Moreover, the combination of a low-inflation 
environment and an inflation target in Sweden has been accompanied by a disproportionately high 
proportion of Swedish households expecting no inflation. However, a similar low-inflation trend in 
the United States, which does not have an explicit inflation target, reveals no such rise in the 
proportion of households expecting no inflation. This observation suggests that the way the central 
bank communicates its inflation objective may influence inflation expectations independently of the 
inflation trend it actually pursues.  
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Since Phelps (1967) and Friedman (1968), economists have generally accepted the 
proposition that, in an environment in which expectations converge to fully rational, the natural rate 
of unemployment represents the threshold to which a central bank can permanently reduce 
unemployment without accelerating inflation. Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2000), hereafter ADP, 
have proposed that some agents form “nearly rational” inflation expectations, a behavioral 
assumption whereby agents either underweight inflation (only incorporate a fraction of it) when 
making decisions or, in the extreme, they ignore it altogether. Further, as the economic incentive to 
anticipate inflation varies from agent to agent, the proportion of nearly rational agents in the 
economy is an inverse function of inflation, producing a “kink” in the long-run Phillips curve below 
the natural rate of unemployment (see figure 1, which reproduces the long-run Phillips curve 
derived by ADP from their theoretical model). The mechanism by which this kink is produced is as 
follows: At zero inflation, rational as well as nearly rational individuals expect no inflation, which 
makes actual inflation equal to expected. As inflation rises above zero, the nearly rational agents 
underestimate inflation, and thus overestimate their real wage increases, work more, and thereby 
drive down unemployment. However, as inflation rises, some of the agents that were nearly rational 
at lower inflation rates find it worthwhile to start predicting inflation accurately and thus switch to 
forming rational inflation expectations. As a consequence, as inflation increases, a smaller 
proportion of households form nearly rational expectations, which tends to push their 
unemployment in the opposite direction. The interaction of these two effects suggests that 
unemployment is minimized (employment is maximized) at a low, but nonzero rate of inflation.  
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Source: Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2000), figure 1. 
 
In the ADP model, the natural rate of unemployment is merely a special case of the 
sustainable long-run unemployment rates, in which either the rate of inflation is zero or so high that 
all agents find it advantageous to make decisions using rational inflation expectations. The authors 
stop short of providing precise estimates of the inflation rate that minimizes unemployment and, 
indeed, they “resisted the temptation to call the unemployment-minimizing rate of inflation the 
optimal rate.”
1 The welfare implications of the ADP model are not perfectly clear since, via the 
efficiency wage assumption, productivity also varies with the rate of inflation. Further, the wedge 
between actual and perceived real wages that causes an unwitting substitution between labor and 
leisure needs to be evaluated relative to the distortions created by wage and price frictions in the 
model. But subsequent discussion by ADP is less cautious, and they state that “Zero inflation is an 
inappropriate policy target [of the central bank] because it raises the sustainable rate of  
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unemployment by a significant amount. […] Moderate inflation, which includes the range of [U.S.] 
experience of recent years, with the core CPI rising at a 2 to 2.5 percent annual rate, allows the 
economy to operate with low unemployment. Such an inflation rate yields maximum prosperity.”
2 
Whether it provides a prescription for an optimal inflation rate or not, the ADP model gives 
a rationale for why a central bank might target inflation at a moderately positive level, which, in 
practice, virtually every central bank with an inflation target has chosen to do.
3 The existence of 
nearly rational agents as described in ADP implies that a central bank must produce a modest 
inflation if the minimization of unemployment is among its long-run objectives. 
In this paper we test whether the assumption of near rationality conforms to households’ 
inflation expectations as measured by survey data. We find that these data fail to reveal the 
correspondence between nearly-rational agents and inflation, as suggested by ADP. However, we 
document that the inflation expectations of both U.S. and Swedish households are clearly 
qualitative in nature, and that, during the period of inflation targeting in Sweden, a 
disproportionately high proportion of Swedes ignore inflation when the CPI has been held close to 
the Riksbank’s inflation target of 2 percent. Despite a nearly identical inflation performance, no 
such pattern is revealed in the U.S. data. This observation suggests that the way the central bank 
communicates its inflation objective may influence inflation expectations independently of the 
inflation trend it actually pursues.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we first revisit the evidence presented in 
ADP in support of nearly-rational inflation expectations, and question whether these tests provide 
evidence in favor of their specific form of near-rationality. We then demonstrate that direct 
measures of inflation expectations, as recorded by survey data, are generally unsupportive of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
1 Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2000), p. 19. 
2 Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2001), pp. 7-8.  
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specific form of near-rationality suggested by ADP. However, the detailed survey data, examined 
further in section 3, reveal an intriguing “qualitative” pattern in the inflation expectations of 
households. We evaluate the detailed U.S. and Swedish survey data across alternative inflation 
regimes and document what appears to be one form of “near-rationality” in inflation expectations 
akin to that proposed by ADP. Finally, section 4 concludes. 
  
2.  The Evidence of Near-Rational Inflation Expectations 
In this section, we bring the theory of nearly-rational inflation expectations to the data. We 
first review the evidence in favor of near rationality, as presented in Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry 
(2000) for the United States, and Lundborg and Sacklén (2001) for Sweden. We argue that their 
methodology and data is unable to distinguish their specific form of near-rationality from other 
forms of less-than-fully-rational inflation expectations. To test the specific form of near-rationality 
suggested by ADP, we therefore use detailed survey data on households’ inflation expectations in 
the United States and Sweden.  
2.1. Re-Examining the Evidence In Favor of Near-Rationality 
To test the near rationality hypothesis, Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry estimate Phillips curves of 
the following general form using U.S. data,  
   t t
e
n t t t u L ε γ βπ α π + + + = − ) ( , ,       ( 1 )  
where π  is realized inflation, 
e π  is expected inflation formed at some earlier date (typically, one 
year ago), and u  is the unemployment rate.
4 Equation (1) is estimated in two subperiods, high 
inflation, where the five-year inflation trend exceeds 4 percent, and low inflation, where the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
3 See e.g. Kuttner (2004).  
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inflation trend is less than 3 percent, or, alternatively, less than 2.5 percent. For each subperiod, 
they specify equation (1) using different lag structures, and use alternative measures of inflation, 
inflation expectations, and the unemployment rate. Inflation is measured as the annual percent 
change in the CPI, the GDP deflator, or the PCE deflator, expected inflation is taken from the 
University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumer Attitudes or the Livingston Survey of Professional 
Forecasters, and unemployment is measured as the rate for all workers, the rate for 25- to 54-year 
old males, or as Shimer’s (1988) demographically adjusted series.
5 The alternative specifications of 
the high- and low-inflation samples and the different lag structures, combined with the different 
measures of inflation, inflation expectations, and the unemployment rate yield a total of 144 
alternative estimated price equations for each sample (see figure 2, which reproduces the high- and 
low-inflation βs estimated this way by ADP.) ADP find that while the constellation of the estimated 
βs is approximately unity in the high-inflation sample (mean = 1.00), it is significantly less than one 
in the low-inflation sample (mean = 0.25). This finding is consistent with their near-rationality 
hypothesis as it shows that only a fraction of aggregate expected inflation enters the estimated 
Phillips curve equations in the low-inflation sample, while in the high-inflation sample, aggregate 
expectations are fully incorporated into the estimated equations. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
4 They also estimate wage Phillips curves, with similar empirical results. We therefore only describe the results and 
method used to estimate the price Phillips curves. 
5 As an alternative to using survey data on expectations, they also report results from adaptive expectations using a 
distributed lag of past inflation rates with similar results.  
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Figure 2. Coefficients on Expected Inflation for Alternative Phillips Curve Specifications in High- and 
Low-inflation Samples. 
 
Source: Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2000), figure 6. 
 
Having found evidence consistent with the near-rationality hypothesis, ADP turn to the 
long-run Phillips curve. Using a nonlinear representation, ADP approximate their model using a 
variety of alternative “right-hand side” variables. Regarding the inflation rate that minimizes long-
run unemployment, ADP conclude that “the densest cluster of estimates spans a range from 1.5 to 3 
percent for the inflation rate that maximizes employment in the long run. The estimated 
unemployment reduction from operating the economy at that inflation rate (rather than at zero or 
high inflation) falls mainly in the range from 0.5 to 3 percentage points.”
6 
                                                 
6 Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (2001), p. 7.  
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Lundborg and Sacklén (2001) follow the approach used by ADP to estimate a long-run, 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve for Sweden. When survey measures of inflation expectations 
are used, they find that the unemployment-minimizing rate of inflation is about 4 percent, compared 
to Sweden’s current inflation target of 2 percent. In Lundborg and Sacklén (2003), the authors show 
that under the conditions laid out by ADP, the minimization of unemployment is likely to be 
welfare maximizing. If Sweden were to raise its inflation target to 4 percent, the authors claim, 
unemployment would be permanently reduced from 4 to 2 percent, output would rise, and effort 
would decrease. 
Of course, the fact that the estimated β in equation (1) drops below unity in a low-inflation 
environment is not a direct test of near-rationality but merely the observation that the covariance of 
actual and expected inflation (given the cyclical state of the economy) falls relative to the variance 
of inflation expectations, and this may be true for a number of less-than-fully-rational expectation 
assumptions. As an example, suppose that a fraction of the population expects an inflation rate that 
on average equals the central bank’s long-run inflation target and the remainder form rational 
expectations. Suppose further that if observed inflation remains close to the target, the central bank 
gains credibility and a rising proportion of agents expect the central bank to deliver the stated 
objective. Under such an expectations formation, a β less than unity would also be observed if one 
estimates equation (1) in the low-inflation sample, whereas β would be unity in the high-inflation 
sample. As a matter of fact, any expectations scheme where a part of the population hold 
expectations centered around any constant is consistent with the findings in figure 2.  
As the method and data used by ADP and Lundborg and Sacklén are unable to distinguish 
between their specific form of near-rationality from other, less-than-fully-rational inflation 
expectations formations, we follow the approach suggested by Nordhaus in the general discussion  
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of ADP, and “test whether inflationary expectations in fact have responded to experienced inflation 
in the nonlinear way suggested by the paper.”
7 To conduct such tests one needs direct measures of 
inflation expectations, and we therefore use survey measures of inflation expectations. In the 
following subsections we describe the survey data on households’ inflation expectations and look 
for evidence of near-rationality in the aggregate average responses as well as at the individual level. 
2.2. Evidence of Near-Rationality in Aggregate Survey Data 
Our data on inflation expectations consists of two surveys. For the United States we use 
individual responses from the Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes for the period 1978-1999. 
These data are collected monthly from a national survey of at least 500 respondents. For Sweden, 
we use the Households Purchasing Plans (HIP) survey for the period 1979-2001.
8 The HIP survey 
was conducted on a quarterly basis from 1979 until 1992 and on a monthly basis thereafter. The 
HIP originally consisted of about 10,000 households, but its size has been reduced over time to 
reach the current levels of about 1,500 respondents. 
Both surveys ask similarly posed and structured questions. In the Michigan survey, 
respondents are first asked, “During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go 
up, or go down, or stay where they are now?” Respondents are then asked to quantify their answer 
by the question, “By about what percent do you expect prices to go up (down) on average, during 
the next 12 months?” In Sweden, respondents are asked “If you compare with the situation today, 
do you think prices in general over the next 12 months will [increase, be about the same, decrease 
                                                 
7 Brookings Paper on Economic Activity 2000:1, p. 56. 
8 There was a significant break in the mean survey response at the beginning of 2002, see Palmqvist and Strömberg 
(2004). We therefore choose to end the Swedish sample in 2001.    
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somewhat]?,” which is followed by “By how many percent do you think they will 
[increase/decrease]?”
9,10 
The model used by ADP to derive the long-run Phillips curve contains no dynamics, making 
direct tests of near-rationality virtually impossible. As an example, suppose that the economy is hit 
by a transitory shock to the inflation rate, making the inflation rate increase temporarily. Should 
such a shock induce the nearly rational agents to start forming rational inflation expectations, or 
does a change in behavior require that the shock have persistent effects on the inflation rate? As the 
ADP-model provides no guidelines on what triggers a change in behavior, we proceed along two 
paths. We first identify different inflation “regimes” in the two countries. This approach only 
requires that, to be consistent with ADP near rationality, a change in the expectations formation 
occurs when the economy switches from one inflation regime to another. We also look at  
all available data, which implies that the expectations formation is consistent with ADP near 
rationality if every change in inflation induces a change in the expectations formation in accordance 
with the near-rationality hypothesis.  
To identify the different inflation regimes in the two countries, we conducted Bai-Perron 
(1998) break-points tests on the U.S. CPI and the core CPI in Sweden.
11, 12 These break-points are 
shown in figure 3 together with the average inflation rate between two break dates, henceforth 
                                                 
9 Both surveys probe the “stay the same” response with a follow-up question, albeit with somewhat different purposes. 
The Michigan survey follow-up question concerns whether the respondent intended to say that prices would remain the 
same, or whether inflation would remain the same. The follow-up question in the HIP tries to separate those who think 
that prices will be constant over the next 12 months from those who believe in a small, but non-zero, rate of inflation. In 
the case of the Michigan survey, extreme responses are asymmetrically truncated at the values of –10 percent and +50 
percent. No truncation is used in the HIP. 
10 From October 1995 and onwards there are five qualitative response options available, so this account refers to the 
surveys January 1979-September 1995. For a description of the current surveys, see Palmqvist & Strömberg (2004). 
11 The Bai-Perron test uses a sequential procedure that jointly identifies the number of breaks implied by the data, and 
estimates the timing of those breaks. 
12 The U.S. CPI measures costs of owner occupied housing on a rental equivalence basis. The Swedish CPI includes 
mortgage rates as a cost of owner occupied housing. Thus, to get comparable inflation measures we use the Swedish 
core CPI (called UND1X) as our inflation benchmark throughout the paper, since it excludes mortgage rates (as well as  
  13
referred to as the “inflation trend.” The tests reveal that both nations experienced two break-points 
in our data, yielding three distinct inflation regimes. The regimes are remarkably similar for the two 
countries. In the United States, the first inflation break is estimated between July and August of 
1982, when the inflation trend drops from 10.2 to 3.9 percent. The second break occurs between 
January and February of 1991, when the inflation trend falls to 2.7 percent. In Sweden, the first 
break in the inflation data is estimated between the December of 1983 and January of 1984 as the 
inflation trend drops from 9.6 percent to 6.0 percent. The second break occurs between March and 
April of 1991, when the inflation trend is reduced to 2.5 percent. Sweden announced a formal 
inflation target in January 1993, but at the time of the introduction of inflation targeting the inflation 
rate had already fallen substantially. Thus, our test picks up a break prior to the announcement of 
inflation targeting. Note that since the early 1990s, the United States and Sweden have followed 
nearly identical low-inflation paths, regarding actual as well as trend inflation, after having formerly 
followed higher trends. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the direct effects of changes in indirect taxes and subsidies.) However, all of the results presented in the paper are robust 
to the choice of inflation benchmark in Sweden.   
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Inflation trend, United States
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Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Statistics Sweden, and own calculations. 
Notes: The inflation trends refer to the average inflation rate between two break dates, where the break dates are identified by the 
Bai-Perron (1998) break-point test.  
 
Regarding the difference between expected and actual inflation, near-rationality implies that 
household inflation expectations errors should correspond to inflation in a nonlinear way: At zero 
inflation there is no difference between those who ignore inflation and those who are fully rational. 
Hence, the aggregate (the average across households) expectations error should be zero at price 
stability. In a low, but nonzero inflation environment, however, as some fraction of individuals 
continues to ignore inflation while the rest form their expectations rationally, the ADP-model 
predicts that, aggregate inflation expectations are less than realized inflation. As inflation continues 
to rise, a larger proportion of the population form their expectations in a fully rational way, so that 
the aggregate expectations error, eventually, shrinks as the added accuracy of the rational agents 
more than offsets the increasingly negative expectations errors of the nearly-rational. Eventually (at  
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very high inflation), the ADP framework assumes everyone is fully rational and the aggregate 
expectations error tends to zero again.  
Our first test of near-rationality therefore amounts to computing the average aggregate 
expectations errors across the different regimes, and checking whether these expectations errors 
correspond to inflation in such a nonlinear way. In table 1 we report the average aggregate inflation 
expectations errors for the United States and Sweden in the full sample period as well as in the 
different regimes. 
 
Table 1. Household Inflation Expectations Errors and Inflation in the United States and 
Sweden 
 
Country Period  Average  aggregate 
expectations error 
Average inflation 
United States  1978:01-1999:12    0.39   4.8 
United States  1978:01-1982:07  -1.28  10.2 
United States  1982:08-1991:01    0.63   3.9 
United States  1991:02-1999:12    1.01   2.7 
Sweden 1979:I-2001:12  -0.09    5.2 
Sweden 1979:I-1983:IV  -0.88    9.6 
Sweden  1984:I-1991:I    0.73   6.0 
Sweden 1991:II-2001:12  -0.16    2.5 
Notes: The inflation measures refer to the CPI in the U.S. and the core CPI (UND1X) in Sweden. Expectations errors 
are calculated as the expected inflation minus 12-month forward inflation.  
 
We quickly note that in the United States, aggregate inflation expectations errors are, on 
average, relatively small (about 8 percent of the realized inflation rate), and positive. This is 
somewhat problematic, since rational expectations argues that these average aggregate errors should 
be zero, and near-rationality implies that they should be negative (non-positive). However, a large 
number of studies have found a positive “bias” in mean survey data for the United States when the 
benchmark for comparison is an aggregate consumer price index.
13 In other words, U.S. survey data 
                                                 
13 A recent study of this “bias” is Mehra (2002).  
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on household inflation expectations are typically higher than the officially reported CPI-measures. 
As reported earlier, these survey data do not record household predictions of any particular inflation 
statistic, but rather the growth rate of “prices in general,” leaving ambiguous the benchmark against 
which respondent accuracy should be judged.
14 To compensate for any potential benchmark error, 
we focus on the differences in the expectations errors across the three regimes. In the United States, 
as inflation is reduced from about 10 to about 4 percent, households switch from under- to 
overpredicting inflation. As inflation is reduced further, from about 4 to about 3 percent, U.S. 
households overestimate inflation even more. That average aggregate inflation expectations errors 
in the United States increase as inflation is reduced is a strong contradiction of the ADP near-
rationality hypothesis. 
In Sweden, households’ inflation expectations roughly coincide on average with realized 
inflation. However, as inflation is reduced from about 10 to about 6 percent, households switch 
from under- to overestimating inflation, and, as inflation is reduced further, from about 6 to 2.5 
percent, households again start underpredicting inflation. While the behavior of aggregate 
expectations errors across the last two regimes in Sweden is broadly consistent with ADP near-
rationality, the general, “inverted U-shape” observed across all three regimes is hard to reconcile 
with near-rationality. 
As argued earlier, it is not clear from the ADP-model whether a transitory increase in 
inflation should cause the nearly rational households to start forming rational expectations or if the 
increase must be more persistent to induce a changed behavior. In table 1 we looked at changes in 
the inflation trend, which can be thought of as representing permanent changes in the inflation rate. 
                                                 
14 Bryan and Venkatu (2001b) analyze, among other things, the responses in the FRBC/OSU Inflation Psychology 
Survey and show that about 66 percent of the interviewed households had heard of the CPI. While those 66 percent gave 
very accurate estimates of what had happened to the CPI, their average response to the question about “prices in  
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In the following, we instead consider all fluctuations in inflation and regress aggregate household 
inflation expectations errors on the rate of inflation with the simple, nonlinear form, 
t t t t
e
t t ε π β π β α π π + + + = − −
2
2 1 12 , ,       ( 2 )  
where 
e π is aggregate expected inflation from the survey twelve months ago, and π is the inflation 
rate. If ADP-type near-rationality holds, we expect to find  0 = α ,  0 1 < β ,  0 2 > β , and  2 1 β β > . 
The results of this experiment are in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Expectations Errors as a Nonlinear Function of Inflation in the United States and 
Sweden 
 
Country Period  α  
1 β   2 β  
2 R  






  0.02 
  (0.01) 
0.68 
United States






  0.01 
  (0.01) 
0.52 
Sweden 1979:I-2001:12    -0.24 




  (0.02) 
0.10 
Notes: Standard errors using the Newey-West procedure are shown within parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
a) Uses expectation values posted on University of Michigan’s Survey of 
Consumer Attitudes website which imputes values for “up, don’t know” and “down, don’t know” based on the 
distribution of known responses. 
 
In the first two rows we see the results from the Michigan survey. Aggregate expectations 
errors tend to be about 3 percent at zero inflation. As argued before, a significant constant in the 
U.S. data need not be evidence against near-rationality. Consistent with ADP-type near-rationality, 
we find that the coefficient on the inflation rate is of the expected sign and significant, but the 
coefficient on squared inflation, while having the expected sign, is not significant. In the case of 
Sweden, consistent with ADP-type near-rationality, aggregate expectations errors are not 
significantly different from zero at price stability. However, neither the coefficient on inflation nor 
                                                                                                                                                                  
general” was more than twice as high as the increase recorded by the CPI. This finding suggests that whatever price 
measure households have in mind when they answer the question about “prices in general,” it is probably not the CPI.  
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the coefficient on squared inflation is significant or of the expected sign, which is fairly strong 
evidence against ADP-type near-rationality. 
In figure 4 we show the expectations errors for the U.S. data, together with the fitted values 
from equation (2), as well as the U-shaped relation predicted by the ADP model. The dashed line is 
the expected relationship under near-rationality, where we have assumed that at zero inflation half 
of the agents are fully rational and at 5 percent inflation 95 percent of the agents are fully rational, 
which corresponds to the assumptions made by ADP in their theoretical work. The dots are the 
actual expectations errors from the Michigan survey plotted against the realized CPI-inflation. 
Figure 5 shows the corresponding findings obtained with Swedish data. These figures further 
illustrate the findings in table 2 in that the expectations errors do not vary with the rate of inflation 
as predicted by the ADP near-rationality hypothesis. The figures also suggest that the evidence 
against the near-rationality hypothesis is robust to the simple, quadratic, functional form in equation 
(2), since they indicate that there is no other natural specification that would pick up a nonlinear 
relation supporting the near-rationality hypothesis.  
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Figure 4. Aggregate Expectations Errors and Inflation in the United States. 


































6 OLS  estimated
ADP predicted
 
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumer Attitudes, and own calculations. 
Notes: The data refers to the period 1978-1999. The dashed line represents the predicted relation under near-rationality. The dots 
represent actual expectations errors, plotted against the 12-month forward inflation rate, and the solid line is the estimated 
relationship from equation (2). 
 
Figure 5. Aggregate Expectations Errors and Inflation in Sweden. 






































Sources: Statistics Sweden and own calculations. 
Notes: The data refers to the period 1979-2001. The dashed line represents the predicted relation under near-rationality. The dots 
represent actual expectations errors, plotted against the 12-month forward inflation rate, and the solid line is the estimated 
relationship from equation (2). 
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Overall, we find evidence of the ADP near-rationality thesis lacking in the aggregate data. 
The relationship between errors in household inflation expectations and inflation does not 
correspond to the model’s prediction. However, a complete evaluation of the ADP model requires a 
more careful examination of behavior of the individual household inflation predictions, a topic to 
which we now turn. 
2.3. Evidence of Near-Rationality in the Micro-Data 
A key implication of the near-rationality hypothesis is that when inflation is below some 
threshold, some individuals underpredict inflation, or, in the extreme, they ignore it altogether. The 
lower the inflation rate the greater is the proportion of households that underpredict or ignore 
inflation. A simple test of near-rationality would therefore be to check whether the proportion of 
households that ignore or underpredict inflation is inversely related to inflation. However, before 
doing that we need to address the evidence that households hold very different expectations about 
inflation.
15  
In terms of the ADP-framework, allowing for heterogeneous responses from the proportion 
of households that form rational expectations implies that we no longer know whether a household 
that expects no inflation belongs to the nearly-rational or rational proportion of the population. 
Also, if we allow for heterogeneity among the rational individuals it seems plausible that the 
fraction of zero responses among the rational individuals increases when inflation falls. We would 
                                                 
15 That households hold heterogeneous inflation expectations is documented in, e.g., Jonung (1981), Bryan and Venkatu 
(2001a), and (2001b), Carroll (2003), Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003), Souleles (2004),  and Palmqvist and 
Strömberg (2004). From the early work on survey measures of expectations, it is clear that the causes of heterogeneity 
in inflation opinions are important to consider when testing the assumption of rational expectations formation. See, e.g., 
the discussion about rationality in survey measures between Figlewski and Wachtel (1981) and (1983) and Kimball and 
Joines (1983). Keane and Runkle (1990) provide further insights on this note. The fact that households form 
heterogeneous inflation expectations is, however, something that must be considered when testing any hypothesis about 
expectations formation.  
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therefore expect the fraction of households expecting no inflation to vary inversely with inflation 
even in the case where all agents form rational expectations. 
Near-rationality combined with heterogeneity of responses among rational individuals 
therefore implies that the test for near-rationality must be modified. As inflation falls, there will be 
more nearly-rational households expecting no (or underpredicting) inflation, and there will be a 
greater proportion of rational households expecting no inflation. In the extreme case, where nearly-
rational households ignore inflation, the fraction of households expecting no inflation should thus 
vary nonlinearly with inflation in order to be consistent with near-rationality. In the case where the 
nearly-rational individuals underpredict inflation, ADP near-rationality only requires that the 
fraction of households underpredicting inflation varies inversely (i.e., not necessarily nonlinearly) 
with inflation. In table 3 we show the fraction of households expecting no inflation, and the fraction 
of households underpredicting inflation in the full sample and the three regimes. 
 
Table 3. Fraction of Households Expecting No Inflation, Fraction of Households 
Underpredicting Inflation, and Inflation in the United States and Sweden 
 






United States  1978:01-1999:12  0.18  0.54  4.8 
United States  1978:01-1982:07  0.18  0.66  10.2 
United States  1982:08-1991:01  0.17  0.56  3.9 
United States  1991:02-1999:12  0.18  0.47  2.7 
Sweden 1979:I-2001:12  0.41  0.62  5.2 
Sweden 1979:I-1983:IV  0.07  0.65  9.6 
Sweden 1984:I-1991:I  0.10  0.49  6.0 
Sweden 1991:II-2001:12  0.54  0.65  2.5 
Notes: The inflation measures refer to the CPI in the U.S. and the core CPI (UND1X) in Sweden. 
 
In the United States, there are on average 18 percent of the respondents that expect no 
inflation over the next year, and 54 percent of the respondents underpredict inflation on average. As 
we go from one inflation regime to another, the proportion of households expecting no inflation is  
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almost unaffected, whereas the proportion of households underpredicting inflation falls with the 
inflation trend. Thus, irrespective of which form of near-rationality we are considering (ignoring or 
underpredicting inflation), these findings are inconsistent with near-rationality. If anything, table 3 
suggests that, counter to near-rationality, more households underpredict inflation at high rates of 
inflation. 
In Sweden, the proportion of households expecting no inflation increases as inflation is 
reduced from about 10 to about 6 percent, and it increases substantially as inflation is reduced 
further, which is consistent with the predictions of the extreme version of ADP where the nearly-
rational individuals ignore inflation. The substantial increase in the proportion of households 
expecting no inflation is also associated with a rise in the proportion of households underpredicting 
inflation. The only evidence against ADP in the case of Sweden is that the proportion of households 
underpredicting inflation falls by almost 20 percentage points when Sweden goes from the first to 
the second inflation regime. 
Looking at the full data set, we regress the fraction of households expecting no, or 
underpredicting, inflation on the rate of inflation with the simple, nonlinear form, 
t t t f ε π β π β α + + + =
2
2 1 ,       ( 3 )  
where  f is the fraction of households expecting no, or underpredicting, inflation, and π is the 
inflation rate. We expect to find  5 . 0 = α ,  0 1 < β ,  0 2 > β , and  2 1 β β >  if ADP near-rationality 
holds. The results of this experiment are in table 4. 
  
  23
Table 4. Proportion of Households Expecting No Inflation and Proportion of Households 
Underpredicting Inflation as a Nonlinear Function of Inflation in the United States and 
Sweden 
 
Country Period α  
1 β   2 β  
2 R  
United States, 
no inflation 










1978:1-1999:12     0.20
*** 
(0.05) 































Notes: Standard errors using the Newey-West procedure are shown within parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
 
Table 4 shows that, in the United States, there is no relation between the proportion of 
households expecting no inflation and the actual inflation rate. Regarding the proportion of 
households underpredicting inflation, we find that both the coefficient on inflation and the 
coefficient on squared inflation are of the wrong sign and significant. For Sweden we find that both 
the fraction of households expecting no inflation and the fraction of households underpredicting 
inflation conforms with the predictions of near-rationality. 
Figures 6 and 7 show the fraction of households expecting no inflation over the coming year 
as a function of the realized inflation rate in the United States and Sweden, respectively. We have 
also included the estimated relationship from table 4 in the figures. In the U.S. data, there is no 
relationship between the realized rate of inflation and the proportion of households predicting price 
stability. Thus, our findings for the U.S. in table 4 are robust to the simple quadratic functional form 
we assume in equation (3). We also see that the results are much different in the HIP data for 
Sweden. Clearly, the proportion of Swedish households predicting no inflation jumps, and 
substantially so, when the realized rate of inflation falls below 3 percent. Thus, the behavior of the 
proportion of households expecting no inflation is broadly in line with the predictions of ADP.  
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Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumer Attitudes, and own calculations. 
Notes: The data refers to the period 1978-1999. The dots represent the proportion of households expecting no inflation, plotted 
against the 12-month forward inflation rate, and the solid line is the estimated relationship from equation (3). 
 














































Sources: Statistics Sweden and own calculations. 
Notes: The data refers to the period 1979-2001. The dots represent the proportion of households expecting no inflation, plotted 
against the 12-month forward inflation rate, and the solid line is the estimated relationship from equation (3).  
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Similarly, we can check the proportion of U.S. and Swedish households who underpredict 
inflation as a function of realized inflation (figures 8 and 9), and again, we observe a striking 
difference between the two nations. In the United States, the proportion of households 
underestimating inflation is negatively related to inflation, in direct conflict with the predictions of 
ADP near-rationality. However, in Sweden, the proportion of households under-predicting inflation 
rises appreciably as inflation falls under 3 percent, again, seemingly consistent with the predictions 
of the ADP framework. However, at rates of inflation greater than 5 percent, the under-prediction of 
inflation by Swedish households rises again, which is hard to reconcile with their model.  
 














































Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics, University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumer Attitudes, and own calculations. 
Notes: The data refers to the period 1978-1999. Each dot represents the proportion of households underpredicting inflation, plotted 
against the 12-month forward inflation rate, and the solid line is the estimated relationship from equation (3). 
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Sources: Statistics Sweden and own calculations. 
Notes: The data refers to the period 1979-2001. Each dot represents the proportion of households underpredicting inflation, plotted 
against the 12-month forward inflation rate, and the solid line is the estimated relationship from equation (3). 
 
Thus, we have shown that the evidence in aggregate survey data is generally unsupportive of 
near-rationality, both in the United States and in Sweden. In the U.S. microdata we find further 
evidence against near-rationality, whereas the Swedish microdata seem more supportive of ADP-
type near-rationality. In order to disentangle this seeming contradiction, we believe a more thorough 
understanding of the distributional characteristics of household inflation expectations is in order. 
Specifically, how are inflation expectations distributed across households and in what ways is that 




3.  “Focal Points” and the Qualitative Nature of Household Inflation 
Expectations 
 
Checking year-ahead inflation expectations in the United States, as measured by the 
Michigan survey, reveals that less than 5 percent of all responses are noninteger values, that is, 
responses tend to be given as discrete numbers. Moreover, the distribution of U.S. expectations is 
strangely multimodal, with nearly equal shares of respondents expecting rates of price increases of 
0, 3, and 5 percent. Further, the distribution also has disproportionately large shares of responses at 
7 and 10 percent. See figure 10, which shows the distribution of year-ahead household inflation 
expectations in the United States and Sweden. These distributions are computed from more than 
100,000 individual survey responses in the United States and about 300,000 responses in Sweden.  
The distributional characteristics of the HIP data for Sweden reveal a strikingly similar 
propensity for household inflation expectations to concentrate around a few discrete numbers. As in 
the United States, the Swedish distribution has disproportionately large shares of respondents 
expecting 0, 5, and 10 percent inflation. The concentration around 3 and 7 percent is, however, less 
pronounced in Sweden. For the full-sample, the proportion of Swedish households reporting an 
expectation of price stability is also much larger than what is observed for the United States (40 vs. 
17 percent.) The formation of expectations in both the United States and Sweden thus appear to be 
formed in terms of “focal points”, which we define as an expected inflation at which the proportion 
of responses is greater than the integer response immediately above and below it.  
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Sources: University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumer Attitudes, Statistics Sweden, and own calculations. 
Notes: The data refers to the period 1978-1999 for the United States, and 1979-2001 for Sweden. The bars represent the proportion 
of households expecting a particular inflation rate in each country.  
 
The unusual and unexpected congregation of household inflation expectations around certain 
focal points suggests that households form their inflation predictions in largely qualitative terms. 
That is, they tend to report inflation predictions that are consistent with no, low, and high inflation, 
but they do not appear to distinguish between potential minor variations around those rates. We 
believe this finding is broadly in the spirit of ADP near-rationality—a substantial share of 
households may not have adequate incentive to accurately gauge the inflation outlook beyond these 
rather broad characterizations. We refer to this idea as the formation of “qualitative expectations,” 
of which the ADP near-rationality is a particular subset. 
To investigate whether these focal points in household inflation predictions are stable (i.e., 
whether inflation alters the location of a focal point) we studied the monthly distributions of 
responses in the two surveys. Using our definition of a focal point, an expectation with a higher  
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proportion of responses than the integer response immediately above and below it, we recorded the 
proportion of months that a given expectation satisfied that definition. The results are shown in 
table 5. 
For example, in the Michigan survey, the proportion of households expecting zero inflation 
exceeds the proportion of those expecting 1 percent inflation and those expecting 1 percent 
deflation in 90.8 percent of all survey months. Similarly, proportions of reported household 
inflation expectations of 3, 5, 7, and 10 percent satisfy our definition of a focal point in almost 
every month. These focal points are also stable across the three inflation regimes, see the following 
three columns in table 5, suggesting that the focal points are largely unaffected by the inflation 
trend pursued by the Fed.  
Table 5. Focal Points in Inflation Expectations, United States and Sweden  



















0 90.8%  100%  88.2%  90.7%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
1  3.8% 0.0% 7.8% 1.9% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
2  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  69.1%  45.0%  51.7%  77.9% 
3  99.6% 100% 100% 99.1%  29.6%  55.0%  41.4%  22.1% 
5  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  100%  100% 
7 93.6%  100%  99.0%  85.1%  29.6%  0.0%  27.6%  35.4% 
8  0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%  24.5%  100%  44.8%  5.5% 
10  100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  100%  100%  100% 
12  4.8% 3.6% 7.1% 2.9%  27.0%  100%  28.6%  3.2% 
13  37.6% 72.7% 33.3% 21.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
15  68.7% 83.6% 65.4% 63.2% 75.0% 100%  96.6%  64.9% 
16  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Inflation 4.8%  10.2%  3.9%  2.7%  5.2% 9.6% 6.0% 2.5% 
Note: The proportions reported in the table refer to the proportion of months a particular response is picked more 
often than the integer immediately above and below it. To save space, we have omitted those integers that never 
satisfied our definition of a focal point, i.e., 4, 6, 9, 11, and 14 percent.  
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In Sweden, the same numbers satisfy the definition of a focal point in almost all survey months, 
with a couple of exceptions. The most notable exception regards the responses in the 1-4 percent 
range. While 3 percent was the most common focal point in this range during the first inflation 
regime, 2 and 3 percent are almost equally important in the second regime, and 2 percent becomes 
the most common focal point in the last inflation regime. This finding suggests that, in Sweden, the 
announcement of an explicit inflation target of 2 percent has altered the location of a focal point, 
from 3 to 2 percent. Another difference from the U.S. findings is that the response of 7 percent does 
not seem to be a focal point in Sweden. In fact, 8 percent is a focal point during the first inflation 
regime, whereas 7 percent emerges as a focal point as inflation is reduced. Thus, our findings 
regarding the stability of these focal points support our speculation that households evaluate 
inflation prospects in largely qualitative terms. 
In figure 11 we examine the distribution of household inflation expectations in the United States 
in each of the three inflation regimes. Note the recurring concentrations of inflation expectations 
around 0, 3, 5, 7, and 10 percent. A large share of responses for inflation expectations greater than 
10 percent is also seen in the high-inflation regime (when inflation averaged 10 percent.) While the 
existence of a focal point is unaffected by the inflation regime, the proportion of responses at any 
particular focal point is clearly related to the inflation regime. The share of households having 
inflation expectations of 7, 10, or greater than 10 percent falls sharply between the high- and 
medium-inflation regimes, while the proportions around 5, and 3 percent inflation rise appreciably. 
As the inflation trend falls further, this time to a low-inflation environment, so do the shares around 
the higher focal points, while the share predicting 3 percent inflation rises (from around 15 percent 
to 20 percent).  
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Sources: University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumer Attitudes, and own calculations. 
 
We next examine the distribution of household inflation expectations in the HIP data for the 
three Swedish inflation regimes (see figure 12.) We note that, as in the United States, large shifts 
from the higher to the medium and lower focal points occur as the inflation trend breaks to lower 
levels. However, as Swedish core inflation breaks downward to a 2.5 percent trend, the proportion 
of household expectations around the zero-inflation focal point jumps sharply in a way certainly 
suggestive of ADP near-rationality. This proportion of zero-inflation responses is nearly three times 
greater than what we see in the U.S. data, despite the fact that the nations followed the same 
inflation trend over roughly the same period. Thus, while the Swedish data seems supportive of 
near-rationality, the observed differences between the two countries instead suggest that the 
findings are a consequence of a changed policy.  
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Sources: Statistics Sweden, and own calculations. 
 
One key distinguishing characteristic between the two nations’ inflation experiences is that 
Sweden’s low-inflation period has been accompanied by a formal inflation objective for the 
Riksbank centered on 2 percent. The announcement of this target corresponds to the date at which 
the HIP-data record a sharp rise in the zero-inflation expectations responses. It is curious that the 
modal focal point for the HIP data is zero, and not the announced 2 percent inflation objective of 
the central bank. This may be explained by the observation that while a large percentage of Swedish 
households understand that one of the Riksbank’s main tasks is to maintain price stability (44 
percent), only about 22 percent know that the operational inflation target is defined as an annual 
increase in the CPI of 2 percent.
16 In other words, the Swedish public seems to have appreciated 
that the Riksbank is targeting inflation while remaining relatively unaware of what, exactly, that 
                                                 
16 Riksbank Survey of Monetary Policy Credibility, October 14, 2002. The main results are summarized in Sveriges 
Riksbank Press Release No. 60, 2002.  
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target is. This type of central bank credibility may have induced the near-rational type of 
expectations response we observe in the Swedish survey data. 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we considered the evidence of “near-rationality” in household inflation 
expectations using detailed survey data. We reject the specific form of near-rational inflation 
expectations suggested by the work of Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry and are unable to demonstrate 
several of the key testable propositions of their theory. In particular, the U.S. data seems very 
unsupportive of near-rationality, whereas the Swedish data is more inconclusive.  
The detailed survey data reveal the existence of “focal points” in the distribution of inflation 
expectations responses, which seems to indicate a largely qualitative character of the way inflation 
expectations are formed – households tend to predict inflation in discrete terms that are broadly 
dispersed. While the locations of these focal points appear to be fairly stable across very different 
inflation regimes, we record significant shifts in the proportion of responses across the focal points 
when the inflation trend shifts. 
Further, we were able to identify a substantial difference between the distributions of the 
inflation expectations of individuals in the United States and Sweden in the post-1992 period, even 
though both nations followed nearly identical low-inflation trends. This difference between the two 
nations was not evident in the higher-inflation subsamples. Our interpretation of this finding is that 
inflation targeting in Sweden has substantially increased the proportion of Swedes who ignore 
inflation. Thus, while our findings for Sweden are broadly consistent with near-rationality we 
believe our findings are a consequence of a changed policy rather than evidence of near-rationality.   
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While our finding that households gauge inflation prospects in broad, qualitative terms, is 
similar in spirit to the behavior posited by ADP, the policy implications are quite different. ADP 
rests on a behavioral assumption – that households underpredict inflation at low rates. Thus, 
according to ADP a central bank can exploit that behavior and permanently reduce unemployment, 
giving rise to a “kinked” long-run Phillips curve. Our findings instead suggest that the average 
response may very well coincide with the actual inflation rate. A central bank that permanently 
raises its inflation trend – in particular if it raises an explicit inflation target – is likely to affect the 
location of a focal point. However, there is no support in the data that households will underpredict 
inflation at higher inflation rates. Thus, such a higher inflation trend will not affect the long-run 
unemployment. We therefore conclude that the long-run Phillips curve is vertical, and that such an 
attempt to “fool” households will only result in higher inflation combined with higher average 
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